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REASONABLE EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES:   
EFFICIENT ABATEMENT FOR A STOCK POLLUTANT 
HOWARD F. CHANG†
In their contribution to this Symposium, David Hunter and James 
Salzman note that two critical hurdles for a plaintiff in climate change 
litigation are the questions of what duty the defendant owes the plain-
tiff and whether the defendant has breached this duty.1  I think that 
Hunter and Salzman are right to focus on the question of what emis-
sions would be reasonable to expect from the defendant, as this ele-
ment of the plaintiff’s case raises some of the most difficult issues for a 
court to resolve.  Unreasonable conduct is an explicit element of a 
negligence claim.2  Similarly, to succeed with a nuisance claim, the 
plaintiff must show “unreasonable interference” with either private 
use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land or a right common to the 
general public.3  As Hunter and Salzman note, the primary approach 
to determining whether the defendant’s conduct is reasonable is to 
weigh the costs and benefits of the alternative courses of action, as re-
quired by the Learned Hand formula applied to the precautions taken 
by a defendant in a negligence case.4  Furthermore, the determina-
tion of the reasonable level of emissions is necessary not only to rule 
on the question of liability but also to determine the appropriate rem-
edy in the event the defendant is held liable.  Whether the court 
awards damages for the harm caused by unreasonable emissions or 
grants injunctive relief, the court must first determine what emissions 
are reasonable. 
This Commentary will discuss some of the complex problems with 
which a court would have to grapple in order to determine whether a 
† Earle Hepburn Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I would 
like to thank the other Symposium participants at the University of Pennsylvania for 
their helpful comments. 
1 David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air:  The Duty of Care in Climate 
Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (2007). 
2 See id. at 1748 (“For negligence actions, the general level of the duty of care is 
well known—to act reasonably or not to act in such a way that creates an unreasonable 
risk of harm.”).   
3 Id. at 1788. 
4 Id. at 1756-58, 1791. 
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defendant’s emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are unreasonable.  
For example, Hunter and Salzman state that trends in technology that 
lower the costs of preventing climate change are making findings of 
liability more likely over time.5  This issue is more complicated than it 
might appear at first blush, however, because the implications of this 
progress in technology for the liability of any given defendant are am-
biguous. 
Consider the effect on a defendant of an unexpected innovation 
that now makes it less costly to abate carbon dioxide emissions.  If this 
innovation lowers the marginal costs of abatement for the defendant 
in question, then this fact alone makes it more likely for us to deem 
the defendant’s failure to increase abatement to be unreasonable than 
would be the case in the absence of that innovation.  This result fol-
lows because the level of abatement that is optimal from the stand-
point of economic efficiency would be higher, where the marginal 
cost of abatement equals the marginal social benefit.6  With a lower 
marginal cost at the prior level of abatement, a polluter must now 
abate more to drive its marginal cost of abatement up until this mar-
ginal cost equals the marginal benefit. 
Suppose, however, that this innovation reduces the marginal costs 
of abatement by others by much more than it reduces the defendant’s 
own costs.  Then it may be reasonable to expect others to abate in-
stead.7  Abatement by others would reduce total expected emissions, 
5 Id. at 1757. 
6 See SCOTT J. CALLAN & JANET M. THOMAS, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND 
MANAGEMENT 86-87 (3d ed. 2004) (illustrating the concept of an “allocatively efficient 
amount of pollution abatement”).  The benefit of each unit of pollution abatement is 
the damage that would have been caused by the emissions that we avoid by that unit of 
pollution abatement.  Thus, the efficient level of pollution abatement sets the marginal 
cost of pollution control equal to the marginal damage of the pollution emitted.  See 
TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 340-41 (6th 
ed. 2003).  Economists can illustrate the optimal level of pollution control as the inter-
section of two sloping curves which represent these two marginal costs as functions of 
the level of pollution:  the marginal costs of abatement increase as we reduce pollu-
tion, while the marginal damage of pollution increases as pollution rises.  See id. at 341.  
If an innovation causes the curve representing the marginal cost of abatement to shift 
down, then the point at which these two curves intersect will shift to a lower level of 
pollution and thus a higher level of abatement. 
7 To minimize the cost of any given level of pollution abatement, the efficient al-
location of that abatement among polluters would equalize the marginal cost of pollu-
tion control for all polluters.  See TIETENBERG, supra note 6, at 345-46.  Economists can 
illustrate this cost-effective allocation of pollution control between two pollution 
sources as the intersection of two sloping curves which represent their marginal costs 
as an increasing function of each source’s own level of pollution abatement.  See id. at 
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which in turn would reduce the harm expected to flow from the defen-
dant’s marginal emissions, as long as the marginal environmental cost 
of GHG emissions is an increasing function of total emissions.  The 
greater the effect of this innovation on reducing abatement costs, the 
greater the increase in total abatement expected to result, and the 
greater the reduction in the marginal harm of the defendant’s emis-
sions.  If the marginal environmental costs of the defendant’s emis-
sions fall by more than the decline in its marginal costs of abatement, 
then we will be less likely to deem those emissions socially excessive, 
not more likely.  Thus, the innovation in question would cut in favor 
of the defendant rather than against it. 
Furthermore, even if the unexpected innovation reduces the 
abatement costs equally for all current polluters, the implications of 
this innovation for a defendant are not necessarily clear.  In particu-
lar, suppose that this unexpected innovation also causes us to become 
more optimistic about the likelihood of even lower abatement costs in 
the future.  What makes the duty of care so difficult to determine in 
the context of climate change is the mechanism of causation.  The 
harm expected to flow from the marginal emission is not simply a 
function of all the other current emissions of GHGs.  Instead, because 
climate change is a function of the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere 
and not of the current flow of these gases into the atmosphere, the 
harm expected to flow from the marginal emission is a function of all 
emissions of GHGs that have already occurred, that are currently oc-
curring, and that are expected to occur in the future.8  That is, to de-
cide what emissions are reasonable now, we cannot simply rely on ob-
servations of past and current emissions.  Instead, we must make 
predictions regarding future emissions. 
Moreover, because total expected harm is a function of all past, 
current, and future emissions, it is possible to achieve a given envi-
ronmental benefit in a number of different ways.  We can abate emis-
sions now by a given amount, or we can abate emissions in the future 
by some amount large enough to achieve the same expected benefit.  
346.  If an innovation causes one curve to shift down more for one source than for the 
other source, then the point at which these two curves intersect will shift toward a 
higher level of abatement for that source and a lower level of abatement for the other.  
The source with lower abatement costs must abate more to drive its marginal costs up, 
while the other source must abate less, until their marginal costs are equal once again. 
8 This fact makes a greenhouse gas a “stock pollutant.”  See id. at 338-39 (discussing 
stock pollutants); see also JONATHAN M. HARRIS, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCE ECONOMICS:  A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 376 (2002). 
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The possibility of intertemporal substitution makes the question of 
what abatement is socially optimal now especially tricky.  The optimal 
allocation of abatement would seek to ensure that the marginal cost of 
abatement sufficient to produce that same marginal environmental 
benefit is equal not only across space but also across time.  If a unit of 
abatement today and a unit of abatement tomorrow produce the same 
environmental benefit, for example, then lower abatement costs in 
the future militate in favor of requiring that unit of abatement later 
rather than now.  This observation would not imply zero abatement 
now, however, if the marginal benefit of abatement is sufficiently high; 
the optimal abatement policy would simply require more abatement 
later than now.  Higher levels of abatement in the future would drive 
up the marginal cost of abatement in the future until it equals the 
marginal cost of abatement today (after discounting costs to present 
value). 
With these observations in mind, suppose we consider an unex-
pected innovation that not only reduces a defendant’s marginal costs 
of abatement but also simultaneously causes us to revise our expecta-
tions of future technological progress.  In particular, suppose the in-
novation is good news in the sense that we reduce our estimates of 
abatement costs expected in the future, not only because the innova-
tion in question has become available but also because this innovation 
is a harbinger of more innovations to come or because it will magnify 
the benefits that will flow from other innovations that we expect in the 
future.  This revision in our expectations may well reduce the mar-
ginal abatement costs that we expect in the future by more than the 
innovation in question reduces marginal abatement costs for the de-
fendant before us today.  If so, it may well be reasonable for us to ex-
pect more abatement and lower levels of emissions in the future than 
we previously expected, which would reduce the marginal benefit of 
abatement today.  If the marginal benefit of abatement today falls by 
more than the reduction in the marginal cost of abatement today, 
then the net effect of the innovation in question is to increase our es-
timate of the “reasonable” level of emissions of GHGs today.  It may 
well make sense to defer abatement until the future, when we antici-
pate that further innovations will reduce abatement costs even more.  
We would be, on balance, less likely to find the defendant liable today 
as a result of the innovation in question.  Thus, a trend toward lower 
abatement costs as a result of technological progress is a double-edged 
sword in climate change litigation. 
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All of these considerations underscore the complexity of the 
Learned Hand formula and of cost-benefit analysis in the context of 
climate change, which requires difficult predictions of future costs 
and benefits.  We need to determine not only the path of technologi-
cal progress in the future but also the future course of public policies 
in all nations around the globe.  After all, whether private firms actu-
ally adopt available abatement technologies will depend on whether 
they have any incentives to do so.  Given that abatement is a public 
good, we would normally expect private parties to use these technolo-
gies only if laws and public policies give them the appropriate incen-
tives to do so.  Furthermore, we would expect private parties to invest 
in research and development (R&D) of such technologies only if they 
expect demand for these technologies in the future, which will de-
pend, in turn, on public policies that give others the incentive to de-
mand these technologies.  The incentive to invest in this R&D also 
may depend directly on public policies that promote such innovation 
through subsidies, not only indirectly on public policies that promote 
market demand for these innovations. 
Thus, climate change litigation may well pose a “political ques-
tion,” albeit in a somewhat different sense than that suggested by the 
court in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.9  In order to apply the 
Learned Hand formula accurately, we must make predictions about 
public policies, which in turn may depend on our beliefs regarding 
the domestic and international political economy of environmental 
laws and policies worldwide.  A court would have to evaluate the pros-
pects for effective regulation in the future, which would in turn de-
pend on an evaluation of the political power of opposing interest 
groups.  If we are optimistic about the regulation of emissions in the 
future, then we may be less inclined to demand abatement today.  If, 
on the other hand, we are pessimistic about the prospects for such 
regulations, then we may be more inclined to demand abatement to-
day.  In light of the difficulties and controversies that would arise in 
any attempt to make such determinations regarding innovations and 
public policies in the future, a court may be inclined to declare itself 
incompetent to decide a defendant’s liability based on such determi-
nations. 
On the other hand, one of the legal developments that may well 
affect incentives to abate emissions is the very climate change litiga-
9 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing the suit and holding that it 
raised “non-justiciable political questions”). 
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tion that is before the court in question.  If the court dismisses the 
plaintiff’s claim as nonjusticiable, it thereby diminishes not only the 
incentives of defendants to abate now, but also the incentives we ex-
pect to encourage polluters to abate in the future—assuming that 
such lawsuits are effective in creating incentives, either directly 
through trial outcomes or indirectly by causing governments to regu-
late GHGs.  Such a ruling thereby increases our estimate of the envi-
ronmental costs we expect to bear as a result of the failure to abate 
now.  Ironically, to dismiss the plaintiff’s case is also to increase the 
social costs of dismissing that case, unless one is optimistic regarding 
the prospects for effective environmental regulations of emissions in 
the future. 
A more limited response to the difficulties in predicting the future 
would be for a court simply to assume that everyone will do what is 
reasonable—that is, private parties will abate optimally, and govern-
ments will adopt optimal environmental policies.  This assumption 
may be unduly optimistic, and thus lead a court to underestimate the 
marginal benefits of abatement now, but it would at least avoid con-
troversial predictions regarding the public policies that will actually be 
adopted in the future.  Adopting this assumption would also be better 
for the plaintiff than dismissing the case outright as nonjusticiable, as 
it would still leave open the possibility of a successful lawsuit. 
Nevertheless, this assumption would leave many difficult factual is-
sues for a court to resolve, questions that may well be beyond a court’s 
ability to answer with accuracy.  In light of these problems, courts 
might consider a whole range of abatement levels to be “reasonable,” 
giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt when there is uncer-
tainty over what level is socially optimal.  This option may allow the 
defendant generous leeway, yet still be better for plaintiffs than out-
right dismissal of the lawsuit.  Plaintiffs may need to suggest such 
strategies in order to persuade courts to consider their claims at all. 
 
